modifications to the Bankruptcy Code appear to be a continuation of the creditors' clawback of creditor prerogatives and the special-interest legislation that followed the 1978 Act.").
part of the bankruptcy statute, culminating in the enactment of chapter 11 in 1978. 5 Switzerland followed a more typically European course and eschewed reorganization in favor of creditor protection. Only recently have they amended their statue to facilitate a rather limited chance for corporate reorganization.
6 But now, with Congress' recent amendments, the two systems have become closer than ever in the past eighty years. In particular, by limiting the length of debtor control over the chapter 11 process, Congress has opened the possibility that American practice will increasingly see either short reorganization cases or failed reorganization cases that result in liquidations. Further burdens on small business debtors will make this likely trend even more pronounced for the smallest firms that find themselves in chapter 11. To address this key question, I offer a comparison of corporate reorganization systems in these two leading commercial, federal systems. In particular, I examine the Swiss system for rescuing failed companies and compare it with the post-BACPA version of chapter 11. While the American system clearly remains more "debtor friendly," the space between the two systems has significantly narrowed. More generally, through this short paper I demonstrate how Congress' ill-conceived amendments to chapter 11 may have damaged a corporate reorganization system that is increasingly the subject of imitation worldwide. 9 As the Swiss experience demonstrates, a truncated reorganization process offers little hope for real reorganization in all but the simplest cases. And the obvious alternative -out of court reorganization -is rarely a realistic substitute for that significant, albeit residual group of cases that require a formal aggregation process to avoid liquidation. expressly contemplates the existence of a liquidating plan (sometimes oddly referred to as a "liquidating plan of reorganization").
10
Chapter 7 provides the kind of liquidation bankruptcy proceeding that can be found in any developed economy: a trustee takes charge of the debtor's assets, sells them, and pays out the proceeds to creditors according to a set statutory scheme. 11 Chapter 11, on the other hand, is a distinctly American contribution to bankruptcy. The debtor controls its case, remaining "in possession" of the estate without a trustee, and exercises the initial right to propose the terms of reorganization.
12
Under both chapters debtors enjoy the protection of an "automatic" stay, which prohibits most collection efforts upon filing the petition.
13
While chapter 11 was often criticized for its perceived "debtor bias," by the turn of this century it was generally agreed that the pendulum had swung in the direction of creditors. 14 The reader should be aware that the SchKG has been amended on several occasions since the 1997 publication date of the foregoing English translation. These amendments do not, however, involve the provisions discussed in this paper.
A complete accounting of these amendments (again, in German) can be found at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/2/a281_1.html. Those interested in the historical evolution of the Swiss bankruptcy statute can find a translation of the law as it stood in the early 1930s (essentially as it was enacted in the nineteenth century, as the law was not first amended until the 1950s), in Switzerland, 5 J. NAT'L ASS'N REF. BANKR. 94 (1931 Upon commencement of a proceeding, the debtor is authorized to continue normal business operations, subject to the supervision of a commissioner. 60 As in the United States, 61 extraordinary business transactions must be approved by the court. 62 The commissioner has no direct counterpart in American law, being somewhat less invasive than the rarely appointed chapter 11 trustee, 63 but certainly more paternalistic than the typical chapter 11 "debtor in possession," charged with a fiduciary duty to its creditors. 64 A closer analogy might be to the monitors appointed in
Canadian Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings. 65 The commissioner is typically a law or accounting firm, nominated by the petitioning party. 66 In addition to supervising the operation of the debtor's business, the commissioner is obligated to [24-Jul-09 prepare a report on the debtor's financial situation. The commissioner is also charged with conducting the various creditor meetings contemplated under the composition provisions.
During the period of stay, the commissioner negotiates a composition agreement between the debtor and the creditors. The agreement is then subject to review by the court.
74
Among other things, the court must find that any liquidation under the agreement will provide at least as much return to creditors as an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding, and the agreement must provide adequate security for all priority claims as well as claims incurred during the course of the proceedings.
75
The latter requirement has been criticized inasmuch as it restricts the debtor's available cash, further diminishing the possibility of a successful reorganization. Of course, the degree of convergence is easy to overstate. Even a small business debtor in the U.S. still has a more powerful tool at its disposal than its Swiss counterpart. American debtors of all sizes can adjust their secured debts -reducing the secured claim to the value of the collateral and rescheduling payments on the remainder -where as Swiss proceedings have no effect on attempts to collect from the collateral, once the stay has been terminated. 87 American business debtors also benefit from a stay that goes into place upon filing the petition, and more direct control over the formulation of a reorganization plan.
At least in the small business area, it does seem like the two jurisdictions are headed to the same point. Indeed, immediately after 2005 it seemed as though the two jurisdictions might pass each otherwith the Swiss system offering a better chance at reorganization --a
IV. Conclusion
This article has provided a brief overview of the Swiss business bankruptcy procedure, contextualized by reference to recent developments in the United States. The basic story told is one that, on a general level, could be told with many European jurisdictionswhile these jurisdictions have been moving toward more of a flexible, reorganization based system, the United States amended chapter 11 to reduce its utility. 91 The Swiss example, however, is especially interesting given Switzerland's federal structure, as well as its unique role, especially among Continental jurisdictions, as a financial center.
Both make Switzerland and the United States particularly relevant to each other when it comes to business bankruptcy.
